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ST~Et:I' CF SENATOO MIKE HANSFIEID 
TH:i) mESIDO.."T 'S FCREIGN POLICY RE<RGANIZATION PLA!IS 
July 311953. 
On August 1, President Eisenhower's reorganization plans for the conduct 
of foreign affairs will go into effect. Under Plan No. 7 an independent 
Foreign Operations Administration will be created to house all the foreign aid 
programs which are now administered separately b.y the Xutual Security Agency, 
the State Department, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Under 
Plan No , 8 a new United States Information Agency will absorb the overseas 
information programs of the Department o:f State and MSA. 
In sending these plans to Congress, the President has made clear that he 
believes the consolidation of foreign aid programs in one independent agency 
and the information programs in another \olill result in more efficient and mor e 
economical administration~ He bas also claimed that responsibility for foreign 
policy below the presidential level will be more clearly assigned to the 
Secretary of State after the two reorganizations. 
I concur in the aiws that the President has in mind in proposing these 
reorganizations. ~~imum efficiency and economy are desirable ends in any 
governmental undertaking and especially in one which consumes as large a portion 
of our budget as our foreign operations do today. And r esponsibility for con-
ducting the relations of the United States with other countries should be 
centralized in the Secretary of State. Too much is at stake to tolerate what 
the President has described as "clouded" responsibility. 
I do not concur , however, in the viev that these reorganization plans 
represent the best way to obtain either ~~imuc efficiency and economy or 
clear-cut responsibility for foreign policy. 
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I will not actively oppose the reorganization because as far as possible, 
I vant President Eisenhower to have the kind of executive establishnent which 
he feels is necesse.ry to carry out his program. I believe , furthermore , that 
the plans vill eradicate so~ of the more obvi0us flavs in the present system. 
I am compelled, however , to state my belief that the President ' s reorganization 
does not go far enough. It is , in my opinion, a half- way measure which gets 
at the problems but stops short of solving them. 
If Reorganization Plan No. 7 went one step further, if it placed the new 
Foreign Operations Administration actually in the Department of State under a 
Deputy Secretary or the equivalent then, I believe, the President might reach 
the objectives which be seeks. 
If Reorganization Plan No. 7 is examined point br point, it is clear that 
the proposal goes half way 1 but only half way, to .. sards correcting the major 
defects in the present organization of foreign aid . 
First , Mr • Eisenhower stated that in the recent past there has boen a 
lack of clear assignment of centr al r esponsibility for foreign policy below 
the presidential l evel. He stated further that he was "taking the necessary 
steps to confirm the hi stor ic r esponsibility of the Department of State as the 
agency r esponsible under t he President for the development and contr ol of 
foreign policy and all r elations wi th foreign gover nments. " Does he consider 
that he has done this merely by issuing directives emphasizing that the Secretary 
of State is r esponsible for advising and assisting him in the formulation and 
control of foreign policy? 
He has outlined the relationship which should exist between the Foreign 
Operations Administration and the State Dcpartnent . His instructions are 
supposed to ensure that the Secretary of State will have adequate policy control 
over foreign aid programs conducted by the Foreign Operations Administration. 
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These instructions go half-way, but only half-way. They do indicate that 
the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration will be somewhat more 
responsive to the Secretary of State than -were the Directors for the Hutual 
Security Agency and the Economic Cooperation Administration before him. In 
this regard, Reorganization Plan Noo 7 is an improvement. But the lines of 
authority running from the Secretary of State to the Foreign Operations Adminis-
trator are still too tenuous, too vague to assure effective coordination be-
tween policy and operations. Reduced to fundamentals, the plan says in effect 
we are going to have teamwork on foreign policy from these two teams because 
we are going to have teamwork. This will -work if the Foreign Operations 
Administrator recognizes the Secretary of State as the quarterback and if he 
understands the signals that are being called. If either decide to play by 
themselves, or what is even more likely in the mystical language of bureaucracy, 
the signals are not clearly understood, then we shall have the two teams stumbling 
around the world, Although the field is large, so too are these teams, and 
sooner or later they will be stumbling over each other, 
It seems to me that this whole problem could be eliminated by the simple 
act of giving the State Department real, not theoretical, control of .the foreign 
aid programs, by the simple act of moving l~. Stassen's household, so to speak; 
into Mr. Dulles household, Both might profit from this more intimate association. 
The policy maker would become more conscious of the practical problems of turning 
his objectives into operating realities. And the policy operator would be 
constantly reminded that, in the last analysis, without objectives there is little 
point in operating. If they were together t he Secretary of State and the Foreign 
Operations Administrator ~ould look out over the world situation from the same 
wino0w. We could then have greater expectation that they would see relatively 
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the sar.ce conditions a.'ld develop a relatively cor:.mon approach to them. 
The second major deficiency ~hich the President hopes to correct tr~ough 
Reorgllllization Plan No. 7 is the dispersion of foreign operational progra.n::::> through-
out the executive branch. Host of us agree that the lack of concentration of these 
programs has resulted in waste end inefficiency. Observer aft0.r observer 1 com-
mittee after committee has reported that there are too many American agencies 
abroad, too many American employees , with a resultinB duplication a.~d overlapping 
of personnel. For instance, at the end of 1952 a Presidential mission headed by 
the Secretary of Commerce reported: 
There was an almost unanimous opinion that we have too many people 
and too many agencies in Western Europe. \olhile we were most favorably 
impressed with the high quality of many representatives of the United 
States abroad, it would appear that their efficiency and morale are im-
paired by the fact that there are too many people doing too many things. 
Confusion and wasted effort are the result. France , and in particular 
Paris, may be taken as an exampleo There are at the moment four men each 
with the title of "ambassador" in Paris. French government officials are 
approached on the same problem by different individual s each claiming to 
have or perhaps having authority to act. The situation is duplicated in 
practically every other country of Western Europe. 
From my own experience I am convinced that consolidation of these agencies 
operating in the foreign field is absolutely necessary. Last Nov~ber and December 
as t he chairman of the Subconnnittee on Europe of the Foreien Affairs Committee, I 
was part of a study mission to several countries of that continent. We saw es-
sentially the same situation as reported on by the Presidential mission--too many 
Americans, doing too many things, and in the process creating resentment and wide-
spread confusion. In Paris alone, there were four Anbassarlors and three l<inisters. 
In eleven Western European countries there were four special ambassadors and 
fifteen ministers in addition to the regul£.r diplolllE..tic beads of missions. 
The study mission of the House Foreibn Affairs Co~ittee made sever~l 
recommendations which we felt would improve the organization of foreign 
operations abroad" At the country level we urged that the Ambassador , in 
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addition to his diplonatic and consular activities be given full responsibil ity 
for the information program, for foreign aid functions and possibly for co-
ordination of Uo s. military activities. We urged that the final authority 
of the regular Ambassador over all official American activity in the country 
remain unchallenged by the presence of other Americans even though they might 
have the rank ol.' ambassador or minister. Only in this v1ay can the United 
States have a single Dource of policy in each country. And in this way, too, 
we can hope to conduct our overseas activities at much less cost and with much 
more effectiveness than when numer ous ambassadors and ministers vie for posi tion. 
For the regional level we recotmaended that the Office of the Special 
Representative in Europe be abolished. This office ho.d grown unwieldy and 
had contributed to the confusion, bafflement , and frustration of Europeans 
trying to go through proper channels . In its place we recommended that 
representation to the region be limited to a United States oission to the 
North Atlantic Council with sufficient personnel in the economics field to 
permit representation to regional economic organizations. 
Some of the recommendations \.Jhich \.Je made last year will be carried 
out by the President ' s reorganization plano For instance, the office of 
the Special Representative in Europe is to be abolished. That alone will 
reduce confusion abroad, providing the pr oposed new mission to r egi onal 
organizations is kept as small as possible. 
The President has also taken steps to strengthen the position of our 
regular Ambassadors , primarily by directir.e that 11The Chief of the United 
States diplomatic mission in each forcicn country must provide effective 
coordination of , and foreign policy direction with rerpect to , all TJnite<i 
States Covernment activities in the country. " 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 12, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 6 -
Reorganization Plan do. 7 has still other merits , It should eliminate 
some waste and inefficiency by t!'le consolidation of t·1utual Security Administra-
tion, Technical Cooperation Administration and the Institute of Inter-Anorican 
Aflairs. A single organization instead of several will administer all the 
major foreien assistance programs with the excepti~n of military aid . If there 
is now the will to abolish the adm!nistrative superstructures of these various 
projects, there can be a savings in cost of operati0nso 
Even this consolidation, h0wever, will not get at the major source ~f 
duplication and overlappingo That is to be fow1d in the activities of embassies 
and the MSA missions , primarily in the economic , information, and administrative 
areas . Since independent agencies are being established for information programs 
and for economic programs , and since each will have an administrative structure 
separate from the Department of State , how can the r eorganization plan possibly 
end overlapping in the three areas where it most widely exists , that is in in-
formation , economic affairs , and administration? 
The only way that duplication in these major fields of overseas activity 
can be eliminated is to center all of them in the Department of State, This 
was the recommendation of the House subcommittee which went to Europe last fall . 
It was the recommendation of the two chief study groups sent by the Executive 
Branch1 0ne by the last administration and one by the present administration, 
I would like to quote from conclusions of the former Secretary nf Commerce 
concerning these problems in t he administration of f0reign aid. Mr. Sawyer 
stated: 
Nor is the solution the creation of one new over-
all permanent department wh~se only assic~ent would be 
to give away Uncle Sam's money or to handle purely foreign 
economic affairso The creation of such a pernanent depart-
ment would prove to be one of our roost expensive follies . 
All matters which involve the relationship of the United 
States with other com1tries should be handled by the existing 
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permanent departments and agencies of government. 
The State Department should either specifically handle 
or should coordinate all of our foreign political and 
economic activities, with due allowance for practices 
and activities authorized by law or long- standing 
practice being carried on by other permenent agPncies. 
For too long the State Department has suffered under 
the hanaicap of trying to administer foreign policy with 
its hands tied behind it . 
The same decision was reached by the evaluation team of 54 business;oen sent 
by Mutual Security Director Stassen this year to evaluate Mutual Scc;xrity 
Programs in certain cotmtries" Their report , submitted in He.rch, stated 
that "Regardless of the original necessity of establishing separate organiza-
tions, we believe that e.ctivities having to do with our foreign relationships 
are a responsibility of the Department of State and si1ould now be operated 
Beyond these valid analyses there is one overriding consideration arguing 
for consolidation of foreign ec:momic programs within the State Department 
rather than in an independent agency. It is the compelling argument that in 
the interests of the American people who have the financial burdens of overseas 
operations and in the interests of our foreign policy objectives , we must begin 
to lay the groundwork for the terminatiou of all massive foreign aid. 
I do not believe that the creation of another new agency is preparation 
for ending foreign aid or any part of it . On the contrary, I believe it is 
preparation for its perpetuationo I would like to make clear that in opposing 
the indefinite continuance of foreign aid I am not opposing at this time the 
Mutual Security Program or any foreign aid proaram which contributes vitally 
to the safety and welfare of our o'vm peopl e. Economic aid in the past has to 
a large degree been responsible for ste!~nin~ the tide of Communism abroad 
and for reviving faith in a democratic future in mc.ny parts of the world. 
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Hilitary aid h~s served t.:f> a cr.ta.lyst in building up defense forces in 
friendly countries. This buildup has enabled us to keep our own rnili tary 
budget within msnaL~ proportions and has proved to be thus far a 
deterrent to further Soviet q:gression, Fordgn aid1 perhaps more than 
anJ~hing else, has provided vivid proof to ~he world that this country is 
capable of rising wisely and effectively to the demands of world leadership 
in tiMe of peace . But the demands of leadershjp also require us to knew 
when to stop as well as when to start; wl!en to sense a chanee in a situPtion 
that produces a change in the requir ements for deali~g with the situationo 
It is not evidence of creative leadership but of the a~ser.cs nf it, if we 
continue to work the same policy into the grow1d long after the time has come 
to alter ito 
As I have pointed out before, for eign aid is now approaching a point of 
diminishing r eturns. Its constr uctive results have been declining and it has 
begun to pr oduce r esentment and impatience both in thi s country and broad. The 
negative effects are on the ver ge of out- weighing the positive. We will &ccomplish 
little by continuing to reiterate slogans which in past yeers kindled real 
enthusiasw in Europe and in Amer ica but ~hich now grate on the ear , We will 
accomplish littl e by driving the P~erican people to do what they once did 
willinely. And we will accomplish little by encouraging the proud and r.ble 
people o1' free countries abroad to remain depC;ndent on us year after yeur . The 
demands of leadership in this changing hour urge that the Uc s. take the initiative 
and , together with other free nations, turn this one- way aid into two-way trade. 
Hassive foreign assistance was desiructcd as a temporary , emergency measure; 
it should never be allowed to become a per1aanent fixture of our foreign policy, 
Nevertheless Mr ~ Stassen, Director of the Hutual Sect:=ity Program, recently said 
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that the aid proeram might have to continue for ten years , and according to 
press reports , President Eisenhower has also indicated the same belief. These 
views are predicated on a continuance of the danger of communist aggression 
for nt least that periodo 
I cannot predict how long the Soviet threat will persist. It could endure 
for decades . The fact that the totalitarian menance is likely to go on indef• 
initely is all the more reas~~ to develop permanen~ solutions which will not 
drain the .A!nerican econ..,my and which will not irritate both the giver and the 
receiver by a prolonged one-sided dependenceo 
If we really must co~ ..... inue foreign aid for a "·n::.le ~.vnger 1 then from the 
point of view of eventual termination it would be much wiser to have it admin-
istered by existing agencies. Anyone who is familiar with the workings of 
government knows that the chances of foreign aid endang even after ten years 
are remote if in the meantime we have permitted an independent bureaucracy to 
developo 
If the program is administered by existing agencies , military aid could 
be handled by the Defense Department and all other programs by the State 
Department . These t•:o agencies are permanent departments which can add a 
function without necessarily adding a new administrative superstructure and 
who can surrender a function without completely abolishing themselves e 
Centralization of this kind would also be much more efficient. At the 
present time military aid, ~hich accounts for 80% of the Mutual Security funds , 
is already administered b,1 the Defense Department. The Mutual Security Admini-
strator coordinates, directs , and supervises the aido He in turn receives 
policy guidance from the Sscretary of State. Hust "~e have this middleman? 
Would it net be more effective to have the Defense tepa.rtuent coordinate 
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directly with the State Department rather than having to go through the Director 
of the Foreign Operations Adcinistration? 
Aid prograos other than military could best be operated directly within 
the Department of State. As it i s proposed, the chief duties of the new 
Foreign Op~atione Administration will center on economic aid . To continue to 
bouse the remnants of the Harshall Plan in a large independent s.gency cun serve 
only to encourage unnecessary continuance of ec.onn~!c aid. 
In this interiru stage of winding up our fore::.{;'l aid programs , we must aim 
at increasing the centraliza+.ion which I have been r'escribing. Only in this 
manner <'a."l the admini str at:..;·e f:-r:t.h be r emoved Elnd the p:-~z:·ams boiled down to 
essentials . Only in this way cer. we gradually eliruj~ate ~gencics which are 
dependent on the con·(.inuation of foreign aid programs for their existence. 
The programs can be terminated, one by one at the p:-oper t~.me in an orderly 
mnnner \'ithout losing sight of the human element, w.!.':.hout causing hardship to 
thousands of civil servants who have worked ably and faithfully in these so-
called tempor ary agencies. 
We should also aim in this inter im period at increas1.ng selectivity in the 
distribution of foreign aid3 We should judge each program in each country on 
its merits in terms of our forei gn policy needs. This year's mutual security 
funds will be distributed among sixty countries. In fact about the only 
countries which will not be receiving aid in one form or another are those in 
the Soviet bloc , a few of the British common~ealth nations , and Sweden, Ireland, 
Switzerland and Argentina. Are prograus necessary in 60 countries? We have 
r eached the point where the discovery t hrt a nation is not r eceiving aid is front 
page news. 
Finally, during this interim period , tl!e grea-t; est cl'.allenbe to our leader-
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 12, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 11 -
ship and to the President and his administration who exercise the responsibilities 
of that leadership is to work out a rational successor to present one-way aid-
programs. We cannot for very much longer preserve the cohesion of the non-
communist world with these programs. Nor can we preserve that cohesion without 
an effective substitute. Unless this issue is met - and the proposed r eor gani-
zation does not equip us as effectively as it might to meet it - we will cast 
away the solid gains in international stabil ity that have been made since the 
great upheaval of World \~ar IIo 
At the outset. I made cle~r that I would not oppose the Reorgani zation 
Plans S'lb:nitted by the Pres.:-:le:ctc. But I want to tta~<e it E-.qually clear that 
these plans contain many pi'i:falls~ I suspect that just as ue hc.ve no~ seen an 
end to proposals for foreign aid, neither have we seen an end to proposals for 
administrative reore~~izat~ons. Within a year or t~o, we shall probably 
have before us the sequel ~o the present reorganize' .. ::.•m p:i.a..~s , with the 
Foreign Operations Administration and the Inte:...·national Information Administr a-
tion headed back to the State Department. We might have saved the huge costs 
of still another reorganization if these programs had been put where they 
belong now. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 12, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
